By: Kwame Botwe- Asamoah, Ph.D. Date
: Thursday, 02 July 2015 14:28
Introduction
There
is a fallacy being spewed by naive individuals and functional illiterates that
the British colonial government left huge sums of money for Kwame Nkrumah,
which he wasted. Often some of these Nkrumah’s haters cite figures from cynical
sources on the internet as their reference point.
Sadly,
their abhorrence of Nkrumah, and by extension the electorate, makes it
impossible for them to conceive the fact that the African-centered fiscal
policies of the Kwame Nkrumah internal self-government generated the revenue
for the Gold Coast, part of which was used to finance the Five-Year Development
Plan from 1951 to 1955.
As
this discourse will show, whatever money that was “left” at the time of Ghana’s
independence was, in fact, Nkrumah’s internal self-government’s creation from
1951 to 1956. But in order to dismiss the notion as baseless that the British
colonial government left huge sums of money for Kwame Nkrumah, it will be worth
the efforts to briefly interrogate the rudiments of colonialism.
Colonialism
Colonialism was a racist as well as
evil system by which the metropolis (such as Britain) bonded its colonies to
itself by political ties with the primary aim of promoting Britain’s own
economic interest.
Thus the dominant reason for the
scramble and partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 was for
economic exploitation. The three main features for the colonization of Africa
as the then Premier of France, Jules Ferry, articulated in 1885 were: 1.) to
have free access to raw materials of the colonies; 2) to have ready made
markets for the sale of manufactured goods of the colonizing countries, and 3)
to use the colonies as fields for investment of surplus capital.
Rooted in neo-mercantilism, the
European monarchies and their private deputized agents confined themselves to
grabbing territories outside Europe “on such lines as would attract the most
possible precious metals to” themselves.
In so doing, those agents seized
and/or captured lands rich in minerals resources, from the Americas to India.
In the case of the Gold Coast, the British passed enactments (e.g., “The
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890) that allowed the Crown to cease lands through
dubious treaties, grants, usages, and other means. Thus, the Act of 1890
allowed the British monarchy and its agents to secure “direct or indirect
ownership, control and possession of the land”. In short order, “The Act” led
to extortions and forced concessions, control, and exploitation of rich mineral
resources. From the Gold Coast, the British exported the minerals and other
resources to feed British industries (mills and other industrial plants), then
exported back to the Gold Coast finished goods and products to sell to the
People of the Gold Coast (Kwame Nkrumah, “Towards Colonial Freedom”).
This method of trade led to a
serious “imbalance of trade,” whereby more monies and resources were siphoned
out of the Gold Coast as long as the Gold Coast remained a British
"colony", than were invested in the Gold Coast for the benefit of its
Peoples. Even the limited infrastructure such as the railway lines in the Gold
Coast (starting from Sekondi in 1898 reaching Tarkwa in 1901, Obuasi in 1902
and ending in Kumasi in 1903) were laid down to transport minerals and timber
from areas of production to Takoradi harbour. Social services, such as the
Ridge Hospital was built to cater for the European expatriates in Accra. And
the scanty health centers in other areas like the mining communities and
Sekondi-Takoradi harbor vicinity were set up to facilitate exploitation.
In other words, social services were
put in place for Africans whose labor was directly producing surplus for export
to the metropolis. Even so, a rubber plantation at Fisher (named after
the British settler-owner Holland-Fischer) in East Akyem Abuakwa, where bundles
of processed raw rubber were sent weekly to Takoradi for export to England, had
no health center, school, public lavatory and other basic amenities. (The
rubber plantation is about two miles away from my hometown Ettokrom).
The underlying “exploitation
without responsibility” thrust of the British colonialism can be seen
when, in 1943, forty-one Africans were killed in the Obuasi gold mine disaster
without adequate compensation; as it happened, “the capitalist offered only 3
pounds to the dependents of each of these men as compensation” (Walter Rodney,
“How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”).
In the Gold Coast, the European
trading companies, notably UAC, Cadbury and Fry, John Holt, CFOA, SCOA, A.G.
Leventis, G.B Ollivant exploited the Africans by controlling both the price
paid for farmers’ cocoa beans and the price of imported goods from Europe
(Walter Rodney).
The price of imported goods from
Europe either doubled or tripled. Profits accruing from this one-sided export
and import trade were retained by Britain. It was for this and other reasons
that the British Colonial Government suppressed and/or criminalized indigenous
productions. For example, the colonial government criminalized the locally
distilled gin (akpeteshi) by characterizing it “illicit gin.” At Kwabeng in
Akyem Abuakwa, a man in the 1930s, our elders told us, was arrested by the
colonial police and prosecuted at the colonial court in Koforidua for making a
bicycle with bamboo sticks.
As well, to suggest that the Britain
left huge sums of money for Nkrumah’s government meant that the British
Government contributed to the expenditure of the British Colonial Government.
This is also a fallacy. In the Gold Coast colony, as elsewhere, the British
colonial government raised its own money from various forms of taxes and
revenues (such as house/property tax, poll/head tax and income tax) imposed on
the exploited African workers, farmers and others for the maintenance of the
colonial administration, (including the Provincial and District Commissioners
and their civil servants).
Otherwise, why would Ofori Atta I,
during the WWI, give “eloquent proof of his loyalty to the Empire” by
“contributing large sums of money to cover the cost of an aeroplane” (Jarle
Simensen, “Commoners, Chiefs, and Colonial Government, British Policy, and
Local Policies in Akim Abuakwa, Ghana, Under Colonial Rule”). In addition to
recruiting soldiers, and as part of its commitment to the British “World War II
Fund,” the Akyem Abuakwa State Council generated revenue from cocoa export to
finance the Akyem Abuakwa contingent of the British Volunteer Royal Force put
together to repel the Italian military occupation in East Africa (Kwame
Botwe-Asamoah, “Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies”).
Also, the Asante “chiefs” made
financial contributions toward three British warplanes. For his part, “the
Chief of Adanse alone gave ₤1,000, 00 toward a third aeroplane that Ashanti
contributed as its gifts for the prosecution of the war” (K. A. Busia, “The
Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti”).
The collapse of the British Economy
after Second World War
In the aftermath of the Second World
War, the British economy collapsed for several reasons. First, because its
industrial plants were entirely converted to war production, and partly due to
the severe destruction caused by the war, Britain was unable to produce enough
goods for its citizens.
In this case, Britain imported more
goods than they could pay for with exports. Second, war time needs also led to
huge losses of merchant shipping to submarines. Third, the destruction created the
need to borrow loans for massive house building after the war. Fourth, because
of the destruction of factories and machines, Britain lost much of its
productive capacity, which resulted in accumulation of massive external
debts—particularly to the USA.
Fifth, due to the conscription for
the war, massive unemployment affected socio-economic life in Britain. As such,
recruitment and training of workers were disrupted, thereby having a long-term
adverse effects on the quality of British workmanship and management. Finally,
war time efforts also had an adverse effect on Britain’s balance of trade,
leading to inflation. It was because of these and other devastations of the war
in other European countries that led to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 (see
W. K. Hancock, and M. G. Gowing, “British War Economy” and Michael J. Hogan,
“The Marshal Plan: America, Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe
1947-1952”).
Therefore the British colonial
government in the Gold Coast (now the Republic of Ghana) was not a
philanthropic organization to have invested in the raw materials (cocoa, gold,
diamonds, manganese, timber and others) and returned the profits to the Gold
Coast, let alone leaving huge surpluses for Kwame Nkrumah to “waste.”
The 1951-1955 Kwame Nkrumah Fiscal
Policies and Five Year Development Plan. In his address on the eve of
Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah pointed out that “when spending ₤124 million
during the course of the” Five Year Development Plan, the CPP internal self-government
“had received ₤1 ½ million in aid from Colonial Development and Welfare
Funds. It was not a large proposition and we had in return made our
contribution to the gold and dollar resources of the sterling.” He
illuminated:
“The Gold Coast has contributed, on
an average, 25% of the net dollar earnings of the British colonial territories,
and, taking into account our contribution of around ₤9 million a year in gold,in
the five years from 1951 to 1955 in which the CPP have been in power, the Gold
Coast contributed a net positive balance of ₤150 million to the gold and
dollar reserves of the sterling area. It will be seen therefore, that though
the Gold Coast is small and, by Western standards, not a very wealthy country,
it has made a significant contribution to maintaining the stability of the
sterling area.” (Kwame Nkrumah, “I Speak of Freedom”).
At the time of Ghana’s independence,
“Nkrumah had left $500 million of reserves, accumulated during the colonial
period (from 1951 to 1956), in long-term low interest British securities”
(Richard D. Mahoney, “J.F.K. Ordeal in African”).
A major portion of these reserves
resulted from the Kwame Nkrumah internal self-government’s nationalization of
the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board (GCCMB) Ordinance
(Amendment) of 1951, thereby making “cocoa revenue [a] common national
property.” It should be noted that in reaction to the 1951 Gold Coast Cocoa
Marketing Board Amendment, Dr. J. B. Danquah vehemently opposed the
nationalization, saying that “funds of the GCCMB were not ‘profits’ accruing to
government” (Kwame Ninsin, “The Nkrumah Government and the Opposition on the
Nation State: Unity vs. Fragmentation”).
(Interestingly, the British Labour
Governments of 1945–1951 enacted a political program based on John Keynes’s
economic theory of collectivism, comprising nationalization of industries and
state direction of the economy). But “this great source of productive
investment ($500 million) was unavailable (to Nkrumah’s post-independence
government) in 1959” (Mahoney, “J.F.K. Ordeal in African”).
The above notwithstanding, the CPP
government maintained a budget surplus and a positive balance of external trade
from 1951 to 1955. In 1953-54, for example, 10% of the gross national product
was saved.
Thus “the Government put aside for
public development ₤1 out of every ₤10 worth of wealth produced.” During the
same period, “the corresponding figure for public saving in the United Kingdom
was just over 3% of the gross national product,” while that of “the United
States was just under 2%” (Nkrumah, “I Speak of Freedom”).
By its judicious fiscal policies
between 1951 and 1955, Nkrumah’s internal-self government raised the national
income from ₤20 million to ₤65 million per annum, while expenditure rose from
₤14 million to ₤52 million. Besides, the government redeemed its external
debts, whilst the country’s assets from all sources amounted to nearly ₤100
million by 1955 (Nkrumah, “I Speak of Freedom,”).
From these investments and savings
(including dividends derived from the mining industry between 1952 to 1955),
Nkrumah’s internal self-government designed its Five Year Development Plan and
embarked on developmental projects (without outside loans).
They included: compulsory elementary
school education, construction of secondary schools, teacher training colleges,
technical institutes (all under the Accelerated Development Plan for
Education), hospitals, nursing and midwifery schools, public health program and
centres, roads and railways, the Adomi Bridge, Tema Harbour, tarring of Accra
to Kumasi and Accra to Takoradi roads, Kumase College of Technology and the
present University of Ghana campus. For example, attendance of the teacher
training colleges, nursing and midwifery schools, Kumasi College of Technology
(now KNUST) and the University of the Gold Coast were free with stipend.
(As a child in 1952, I saw the
conversion of the feeder road from Accra to Kumase via Ettokrom to a tarred
road covered with bitumen for the first time; and, my age group had fun
stepping on the freshly sticky bitumen in the evenings).
Prof. Adu Boahen authenticated the
Nkrumah internal self-government’s outstanding achievements in the 1950s in
Basil Davidson’s documentary, “The Rise of African Independence,” when he said:
“The 1950s, to me, were the most important, the most fascinating period, the
period of independence...... This was a period when far more was achieved
between 1951 and 1954; saw a pace of development in this country, which has
never [been] seen.”
But the exceptional pace of
development Prof. Adu Boahen spoke about did not only result from developmental
and planned economy, but it was also due to Nkrumah’s philosophy of
self-determination and self-reliance (by taking over the country’s natural
resources). As a matter of fact, Nkrumah’s holistic achievement (in the areas
of educational, socio-economic and industrial developments) has been recorded
as one of the fastest in a post-colonial history. Sad to say that these
principles of self-determination, self-reliance and human-centered policies are
what have been lacking in Ghana’s public policies since the CIA sponsored
military coup of February 24, 1966.
As the foregoing discourse has
elucidated, the $500.00 million or its equivalent in the British sterling in
the British reserves at the time of Ghana’s independence was the making of the
Kwame Nkrumah internal self-government from 1951 to 1956.
(We should bear in mind that Kwame
Nkrumah surrounded himself with some of the economic giants at the time as his
advisors; they included Sir Arthur Lewis, Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics and
the Cambridge economist, Prof. Nicholas Kaldor.)
In this respect, the claim of huge
sums of money the British left for Kwame Nkrumah’s post-independence regime is
a fallacy and not supported by historical records or any economic fact.
